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ABANDONMENT IN BANKRUPTCY
— by Neil E. Harl*
Bankruptcy is designed to accomplish two objectives — (1)
assure fair and equitable treatment of the unsecured creditors
(the secured creditors are entitled to payment up to the value of
their collateral and beyond that are unsecured creditors) and
(2) provide a "fresh start" to the debtor.1  The concept of
abandonment now poses a collision of those two objectives.
What is abandonment.  In brief, abandonment in
bankruptcy may occur whenever property of the bankrupt is
worth less than what is owed on it.2  The theory behind
abandonment is that if the property is worth less than what is
owed on it, there is nothing to be gained for the unsecured
creditors so the property should be routed back to the secured
creditors who are entitled to the value involved.  In such a
situation, there is no justification to expend bankruptcy
resources managing or administering the property in
bankruptcy if the assets will pass to the secured creditors in any
event.
The Bankruptcy Code specifies how abandonment may
occur.3  The usual assumption is that property is abandoned to
the debtor with the secured creditors then free to foreclose upon
or otherwise seek satisfaction from the property.  Abandonment
to the creditors has been sanctioned by the bankruptcy courts.4   
Under the Bankruptcy Code, abandonment may occur in
four different circumstances—
• After notice and a hearing, the trustee in bankruptcy may
abandon property that is burdensome to the bankruptcy estate
or is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.5  A
trustee may abandon property of the estate without obtaining a
court order authorizing abandonment when there is no objection
to the proposed abandonment by an interested party.6
• On the request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court may order the trustee to abandon any
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is
of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.7
• Scheduled property not administered before a case is closed
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is deemed abandoned to the debtor and is considered to have
been administered.8
• Unless  the  court  orders  otherwise, property of the estate
that is not abandoned and that is not administered in the case
remains property of the estate.9
A trustee or debtor in possession, unless the court directs
otherwise and except for scheduled property which is deemed
abandoned if not administered,10 must give notice of a proposed
abandonment or disposition of property to all creditors,
indenture trustees and committees.11  An objection may be
filed and served by a party in interest within 15 days of the
mailing of the notice or within the time fixed by the court.12
If a timely objection is made, the court is to set a hearing on
notice.13
Income taxation in abandonment.  Unfortunately,
neither the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 198014 nor any other statute
specifies the tax consequences of abandoned property.  Accord-
ingly, the question of who bears the income tax liability from
the transfer of abandoned property to the secured creditor or
from the foreclosure or other satisfaction of abandoned
collateral has been left to the courts.15
What is known.   Statutory guidance is provided for
some steps in the abandonment process–
• The movement of the debtor's property into the
bankruptcy estate upon filing does not trigger adverse tax
consequences.16  The bankruptcy estate is treated as the debtor
would have been had the debtor not filed for bankruptcy.  Thus,
the bankruptcy estate steps into the shoes of the debtor for
purposes of this title (title 26 of the U.S. Code).17
• If the bankruptcy estate sells or otherwise disposes of the
property (sale of grain at the elevator or livestock through the
sale barn, for example) the bankruptcy estate suffers the usual
tax consequences of a sale or taxable exchange.18
• If property remains in the bankruptcy estate at the
termination of bankruptcy, the movement of the debtor's
property from the bankruptcy estate to the debtor does not
trigger adverse tax consequences.19
Theories of taxation in abandonment.  Nothing is
said, however, about the tax consequences of abandonments, so
that type of transfer is apparently left to be handled under usual
tax principles.  With that approach, there would seem to be
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two theories for the taxation of gain or loss from
abandonments20 —
•  If an abandonment is properly characterized as involving a
completed transfer to the bankruptcy estate followed by a
transfer of the property back to the debtor, arguably the
retransfer to the debtor would trigger tax liability in which case
any tax liability would be trapped in the bankruptcy estate.
Any gain or loss would be reported by the bankruptcy estate
and the property would have a basis in the debtor's hands equal
to its fair market value.  The entrapment theory is favorable to
debtors and is in accord with the objective of providing the
debtor a fresh start in bankruptcy.21  As stated in a 1988
bankruptcy court case,22
"the bankruptcy code provides an honest debtor with a fresh
start, free from the burden of past debts....This fresh start has
been described as the most extensive 'since the seven year
release described in the Old Testament.'"
• However, if an abandonment is properly characterized as a
"deflection" of property from the bankruptcy estate, the tax
liability when the property is lost to the creditors would rest
with the debtor.  In support of this characterization, some
courts, notably Mason v. Commissioner,23 and In re
Cruseturner 24 have held that the debtor is deemed to have
continuously owned the property abandoned in bankruptcy.
However, those cases were based on facts arising before
enactment of the Bankruptcy Tax Act which provided
specifically for the transfer of property "from the debtor to the
estate."25
The deflection theory is actually a greater burden for the
debtor than would appear at first blush.  IRS has taken the
position that, because of the discharge of the debtor's personal
liability in bankruptcy, the debt survives abandonment as a
nonrecourse obligation.26  The outcome is that the fair market
value becomes irrelevant and the full difference between the
debtor's basis in the property and the amount of the debt is gain
(or loss) to the debtor.
Tax cases on abandonment.  Four cases, all involving
farm facts, have been litigated since 1987.
In the first case, Estate of Bentley,27 the debtor had filed
Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 1983.  The trustee in bankruptcy, the
same year, sold a corn crop free and clear of liens with the
understanding that the claim of the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) would attach to the proceeds and interest
earned on the proceeds.  In 1986, the trustee determined that the
CCC claim was valid and exceeded the value of the crop.
Accordingly, the trustee applied to abandon the proceeds.  IRS
argued that had the corn been abandoned prior to sale, the gain
would not have accrued to the bankruptcy estate.  However,
once the trustee sold the grain, the estate became liable for the
income tax on the proceeds.  The bankruptcy court stated,
surprisingly, that —
"The effect of the IRS position would have the estate pay taxes
on property to which the estate is not entitled, did not retain
and from which it received no benefit (because it was all
abandoned) because the proceeds became property of the estate
while subject to a lien which greatly exceeded its value.  Such a
result will not be countenanced."28
The bankruptcy court decision was reversed by the United
States District Court, holding that the proceeds of the corn sale
were taxable to the bankruptcy estate.29  The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in affirming in late 1990, stated—
"...a contrary holding would have the effect of burdening the
debtor's fresh start under the bankruptcy law."
The next bankruptcy case on taxation of abandoned
property, In re McGowan,30 involved the abandonment of the
debtor's machinery with a relatively low basis and a substantial
amount of potential gain.  The bankruptcy court held that the
abandonment of bankruptcy estate property by the trustee was
not a "sale or exchange" triggering tax liability chargeable to
the bankruptcy estate.  The bankruptcy court stretched the
"termination of the estate" language in the Bankruptcy Tax
Act31 to cover abandonments.
In the case of In re Olson,32 the trustee abandoned land to
the debtor.  The bankruptcy court acknowledged that
McGowan33 was "overbroad" in defining abandonment as
"termination of the estate" but nonetheless concluded that
abandonments should be covered by the same provision relied
upon by the McGowan court.  Thus, both McGowan and
Olson embraced the deflection theory.
In the case of In re Olson34 the bankruptcy trustee failed to
file income tax returns for the bankruptcy estate35 so the
debtor's accounting firm prepared and fi led  both state and
federal fiduciary returns for the bankruptcy estate, duly
reporting the sizeable gain.  The trustee sued for damages,
alleging malicious interference with the trustee's duties.  The
bankruptcy court agreed the filing was not malicious and
indicated a separate hearing would be set on the issue of
damages and costs.
In the final case to date, In re Laymon,36 the U.S. District
Court for Minnesota in 1989 reversed the bankruptcy court and
held that the bankruptcy court had erroneously approved the
trustee's request for abandonment.  At issue was approximately
$17,000 of income tax liability on farmland.  The trustee had
collected two years of rental on land totaling about $22,000
before seeking to abandon the property.  The court noted that
the trustee had a duty to the debtor as well as to the unsecured
creditors and pointed out that the trustee has a "general duty not
to burden unduly the debtor's opportunities for a fresh start."
The court said that the impact of abandonment on debtors "is
one aspect to consider on the issue of burdensomeness."
In conclusion.  Quite clearly, the entrapment theory is
the only approach that will treat debtors fairly and equitably vis
a vis other debtors.37  Moreover, the entrapment theory is
consistent with the idea of providing the debtor a fresh start.38
Finally, it is submitted that the entrapment theory is most
consistent with established tax law.
To date, the weight of judicial opinion at the bankruptcy
court level has been in favor of the deflection theory.  District
courts have been less enamored with that approach.  The major
issue is whether the Eighth Circuit, which has the case of In re
Olson39 on appeal, will add muscle to the statement that taxing
gain to the debtor "would have the effect of burdening the
debtor's fresh start under the bankruptcy law."40
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CONTROVERSY OVER
FILING FORM 1099B
The IRS is reviewing whether agribusiness firms are
required to file Form 1099B information returns with the IRS
(and with copies to the taxpayer) on purchases of generic
commodity certificates from farmers and contracts with farmers
for future delivery of grain. The issue is of substantial
importance to country elevators and other grain, feed and
processing firms.
The controversy grew out of an audit of two trucker-dealers
of grain in Illinois.  In one of the cases, proposed fines
amounted to $200,000 for failure to file Form 1099B on
transactions involving forward grain contracts and generic
commodity certificates.  Under I.R.C. § 6045, IRS is
empowered to require that "brokers" file Form 1099B on
transactions involving customers who are sole proprietorships
and partnerships.  A "broker" is defined as a dealer and "any
other person who (for a consideration) regularly acts as a
middleman with respect to property or services."  I.R.C. §
6045(c)(1)(C).  Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a) provides-
"(1) The term "broker" means a person that, in the ordinary
course of a trade or business during the calendar year, stands
ready to effect sales to be made by others.
"(2) The term "customer" means, with respect to a sale effected
by a broker, the person (other than such broker) that makes
the sale, if the broker acts as-
"(i) An agent for such person in the sale;
"(ii) A principal in the sale; or
"(iii) The participant in the sale responsible for paying to
such peson or crediting such person's account the gross
proceeds on the sale."
The tax definition of "broker" is much broader than the
definition used generally in the grain trade.  The National Grain
and Feed Ass'n Grain Trade Rule 40 specifies that a "broker" is-
-
". . .one who is engaged for others, on a commission basis, in
negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody of
which, actual or constructive, he has no concern."
Under the grain usage, a grain dealer who takes actual or
constructive title to the grain generally is thought of as a grain
merchandiser rather than a broker.  The tax law definition,
however, does not preclude those who take title to property
from being a broker.
The facts of one of the Illinois cases have been referred to
the national office of IRS for a technical advice memorandum.
A decision by IRS is likely to be several weeks away.
